



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

nor change'; and this conclusion is true. These things do not die, since the Paradise in which they bloom is immortal. That Paradise is no special region nor any given particular spot in time and space. It is here, it is everywhere where any finite being is lifted into that higher life which alone is waking reality."

This passage is certainly eloquent and probably wise, even if the view of reality which it suggests is not easy to make quite coherent. It should be remembered, however, that the gardens that we cultivate are not private preserves. We have to try to plant some perennials in them. And is it so certain that Utopias are always 'stupid'? May not the gardener think of brighter flowers that he might cultivate? Even if Mr. Bradley's doctrine of reality is as true as he believes, the effort after progress would seem to have a considerable 'degree of reality.' But perhaps he does not mean to deny this; and, at any rate, in such a review as this it is not possible to do more than hint at criticisms that might be made. It may be added that the book has an excellent index.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

University College, Cardiff.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRACTICAL. Translated from the Italian of Benedetto Croce by Douglas Ainslie, B.A., M.R.A.S. London: Macmillan & Co., 1913. Pp. xxiv, 591.

This interesting work is, in temper and point of view, fundamentally Hegelian. According to its author, Reality is Spirit: this proposition being taken to express the very essence of philosophy. Philosophical discussion must concern itself with one question, that of the *forms* of the spirit's activity. These, according to Croce, are two only, cognition or the theoretical activity, and will or the practical activity. Each has two sub-forms: those of the theoretic activity are æsthetic, which produces images, and logic, which produces concepts; while those of the practical activity are economic and ethic. Croce, having dealt with the theoretic activity in two earlier works, endeavors in "The Philosophy of the Practical" to complete his exposition of reality.

The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with

the practical activity in general, the second and third with its subforms. It begins by the consideration that man is never governed wholly by either theoretic or practical interests, but that every spiritual activity exhibits the presence of both, though not always in equal degree. Neither is at any time altogether absent. This fact cannot, according to Croce, be proved empirically, that is, by the psychological method,—a method that constantly excites his criticism. Cognition and will are the *only* two forms of spiritual activity; and while *illustration* of this thesis is empirically discoverable, its *proof* proceeds by “the philosophic method.” This method allows the philosopher to assert that no other forms of the spirit besides cognition and will are conceivable or *possible*. To see this, one must withdraw from the world of events, of changes, and of fleeting particulars; and, instead of directing one’s sense-organs toward the external, one must reflect the analytic eye of the mind on the recesses of consciousness, on the eternal and immutable. This, it is said, is what Plato did, and Spinoza, and Hegel. The difficulty is that, if this is not observation, its results are apt to be altogether chimerical.

When we proceed thus, however, we discover, among other things, that feeling is not a specific activity of spirit. By this Croce does not mean that what the psychologist calls ‘feeling’ does not exist. He recognizes, on the contrary, that *feelings* are members of an empirical class, and is willing and anxious to leave to the scientist his classification. What he denies is that there is any ‘feeling’ that cannot finally be reduced to, and included in, either the theoretic, or the practical, activity. The discussion here is of considerable interest, especially when viewed in connection with the common, but highly questionable, theory, that ‘feeling’ is not an ‘object’; while, at the same time, Croce’s contention is in strong contrast with the doctrines of certain other prominent idealists, such as Mr. Bradley, for whom reality is ultimately a whole of ‘feeling.’

In the fourth chapter, it is maintained (1) that *will* and *intention* are identical, and (2) that we err because we desire to err. Both contentions, apparently, are unsound; and though it is probable that neither of them will survive the light of careful investigation, their discussion is marked by great acuteness. It certainly seems strange to hold that, if a physician, desiring to cure a sick man, gives him, by mistake, prussic acid instead

of potassium bromide, the death of the patient was willed and *intended* by the physician. It seems equally strange to hold that the physician makes the mistake because he desires to make it. In this connection, Croce appears to maintain the uncivilized doctrine that theoretical error should be punished (p. 69). Of course, if, whenever I make a blunder in reasoning, I desire to make it, then, to maintain that, whenever I make blunders in reasoning, I should be punished, seems, at least, to have the merit of being strictly logical. All this will no doubt seem bizarre and barbarous. Croce points out, however, that society constantly punishes its members simply because they make theoretic mistakes. The erring boy is slapped, the erring youth disciplined, the erring artist rebuked. And, generally speaking, the student who does not think in accord with the principles of his teachers is, literally, punished: his teachers will not recommend him.

It is impossible even to indicate the many interesting discussions which this book contains. That on free will and determinism, however, is at least arbitrary: *the* problem is stated to be thus and thus, the question of possible alternative statements never being raised—although it would be more correct to speak of the *problems*, than of *the* problem, of free will.

The book is rendered eminently readable by the frequent discussion of concrete questions as illustrations of the highly abstract problems with which its author is engaged. In addition, the translation is, on the whole, exceedingly clear. It will not be surprising if, in the near future, "The Philosophy of the Practical" takes a place among the best-known idealistic treatises.

BERNARD MUSCIO.

Cambridge, England.

THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS. Edited by James Hastings. Vol. VI, Fiction-Hyksos. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1913. Pp. xviii, 890.

The sixth volume of this Encyclopædia fully maintains the high standard established by previous volumes. It contains several articles of the first importance. As an indication of the care which has been taken to find the foremost authority on